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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-EXTENT TO WHICH JUROR'S .AFFIDAVIT MAY
BE UsED TO IMPEACH VERDICT-Defendant was convicted of murder in
the first degree and made a motion for a new trial on the basis of a juror's
affidavit which asserted that the jury had been divided eight to four in
favor of life imprisonment over the death sentence, that subsequently
several jurors introduced into the deliberations the fact that the defendant
had been charged, in another indictment, with assault with intent to
kill, that this became a part of the jury's deliberation, and that, as a
result, the jury did not recommend life imprisonment and, instead, the
death sentence was imposed. On appeal, held, motion for new trial
granted, three justices dissenting. The affidavit was not admissible to
show the effect of the jury's misconduct, but was admissible to show
the existence of misconduct. The existence of such misconduct was
sufficient grounds for granting the motion. State v. Kociolek, (N.J. 1955)
ll8 A. (2d) 812.
In attempting to formulate rules regarding the admissibility of affidavits to impeach jury verdicts, many distinctions have been drawn.1 These
have been necessary to avoid the harsh consequences of the general rule

1 See,
DENCE §68

generally, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2349-2353 (1940); McCORI\UCK,
(1954); 47 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1948); 10 OHIO ST. L. J. 262 (1949).
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that a juror's affidavit may not be used to impeach the verdict. 2 The affidavit has been held admissible where the alleged misconduct occurred outside the jury room,3 where the misconduct was that of a person other than
a juror,4 where the affidavit is in support of the verdict rendered, 5 where it
relates to overt acts and not to either the reasoning process by which the
verdict is reached or matters that inhere in the verdict, 6 and where it is not
used to sh~w the effect of the misconduct upon the verdict.7 There has not
been unanimity of judicial opinion as to what fact situations fit within
these rules. 8 Policy considerations have weighed heavily in shaping the
rules. 9 It has been suggested that the admission of such affidavits will encourage vacillation by the jurors, post-verdict tampering by the parties
and their counsel,10 and the undermining of the finality of the verdict.11 Opposed to these factors is the consideration that the jurors are
often the only persons who can tell of misconduct which may have influenced the verdict and that by suppressing this information the court fails to
do justice in the case involved.12 The adoption of the view followed by
the court in the principal case, which permits affidavits to show the existence of overt misconduct (i.e., misconduct evidenced by words or actions),
makes it possible to satisfy substantially all of the above policy considerations. This view does not make judgments as final as they would be if
jurors' affidavits were not permitted at all, but such finality is neither
2 The rule was laid down in Vaise v. Delaval, l T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785).
Although subject to much criticism, it has received widespread acceptance in the United
States. See, e.g.: People v. Tomczak, 250 Mich. 679, 231 N.W. 63 (1930); Chicago Sanitary
Dist. v. Cullerton, 147 Ill. 385, 35 N.E. 723 (1893).
.
3See Capozzi v. Butterwei, 2 N.J. Super. 593, 65 A. (2d) 884 (1949), where a visit
by a juror to the scene of the accident was sufficient to overturn the verdict.
4 State v. Adams, 141 Ohio St. 423, 48 N.E. (2d) 861 (1943); 146 A.L.R. 514 (1943);
Wilkins v. Abbey, 168 Misc. 416, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 826 (1938); Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio
St. 235, 187 N.E. 862 (1933); 90 A.L.R. 249 (1934).
5 State v. James, 198 Iowa 976, 200 N.W. 577 (1924). Contra, State v. Lindeman, 64
N.D. 518, 254 N.W. 276 (1934); 93 A.L.R. 1449 (1934).
6 It is upon this distinction that the greatest deviation from the general rule has
occurred. Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874); Wright v. Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa 195
(1866); Miami v. Bopp, 117 Fla. 532, 158 S. 89 (1934); 97 A.L.R. 1038 (1935). A distinction along these lines is also incorporated in the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rule 301 (1942),
and in the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, rules 7, 41, 44 (1953).
7 State v. McChesney, 114 Wash. 113, 194 P. 551 (1921); Taylor v. State, 18 Ala. App.
466, 93 S. 78 (1922). A question may also arise as to whether the jurors have a privilege
as to their statements and acts within the jury room. This is independent of the admissibility question and is beyond the scope of this note. See, generally, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2346 (1940); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 465 (1933), noted
in 31 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1933).
s Compare Miami v. Bopp, note 6 supra, with State v. Aker, 54 Wash. 342, 103 P.
420 (1909).
9 The policy rationale of Vaise v. Delaval, note 2 supra, was that the jurors should
not stultify themselves. In that case, Lord Mansfield thought it permissible for third
parties to report on misconduct in the jury room even though this same misconduct
could not be revealed by a juror's affidavit.
10 See People v. Pizzino, 313 Mich. 97, 20 N.W. (2d) 824 (1945).
11 See Caldwell v. F. E. Spears &: Sons, 186 Ky. 64, 216 S.W. 83 (1919).
12 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 13 S.Ct. 50 (1892); Perry v. Bailey, note 6
supra; State v. McCormick, 57 Kan. 440, 46 P. 777 (1896).
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necessary nor desirable. Where the affidavit alleges overt misconduct
which may have· influenced the finding, excluding it achieves stability,
but only at the expense of doing justice between the parties.13 Admitting
affidavits to show overt acts does not encourage post-verdict tampering or
fraud since the affidavit relates to matters of sight and hearing and can be
checked against the observations of the other jurors. Thus, post-verdict
tampering would be successful only if the entire jury had been influenced.
As suggested in the principal case, the test of the jurors' affidavits should
be whether the subject of the affidavit is independently verifiable. This
test can and should be applied to every kind of juror's affidavit, thereby
cutting away the many rules and distinctions which now clutter the area.
Unfortunately, the principal case itself makes an unnecessary distinction
between using the affidavit to show misconduct and using it to show the
effect of such miscOJ!.duct. It is true that an affidavit showing the effect of
misconduct on a particular juror will often be subjective and not independently verifiable.14 But if it is independently verifiable, the fact that
the affidavit goes to the effect of misconduct or to the juror's reasoning process should not require its exclusion.15 Thus, an affidavit based upon verifiable evidence indicating that, prior to the misconduct, the jurors were in
favor of a result different from the one reached should be received.16 Of
course the court will have the final task of determining the actual effect of
any misconduct on the jury's deliberations.17 In some cases it is possible
for the court to find, as in the principal case,18 that the misconduct could
have influenced the verdict and to grant a new trial without the aid of any
affidavit on the effect of the misconduct. But in cases where there is greater
doubt as to the effect of the misconduct on the jury, the court should be
able to make a more intelligent finding on this point with the knowledge of
independently verifiable facts which can be uncovered only by the aid of a
13 To argue against this is similar to saying that a new trial should not be given
where new evidence reveals that a principal witness was lying about a material issue,
since this would destroy the "finality of the verdict."
14 This is so where the juror attempts to explain what influence the misconduct has
had upon his mind. The juror's affidavit in the principal case may have been of a subjective nature in regard to the effect of misconduct on the verdict. But affidavits relating
to reasoning and the effect of misconduct will not necessarily be subjective. See notes
15 and 16 infra.
15 Reaching a verdict by a game of chance or by averaging (quotient verdict) may
be a part of the jury's reasoning process. But this should be the proper subject of a
juror's affidavit since it is independently verifiable. But see Hoffman v. St. Paul, 187
Minn. 320, 245 N.W. 373 (1932); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783 (1915);
52 A.L.R. 74 (1928).
16 Verifiable evidence in this situation would include a poll taken from the jurors
prior to the alleged misconduct. It would not include post-verdict affidavits by the jurors
stating that they had changed their minds due to the misconduct. As to an affidavit by
a juror reporting another juror's expressions prior to the misconduct to show that the
other juror had changed his mind, this would be independently verifiable evidence.
However, in this situation there is the additional question of privilege for a juror's
statements in the jury room which might justify the exclusion of such an affidavit.
17 The court would not necessarily be bound by the juror's affidavit in making this
decision.
1s Principal case at 818-819.
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juror's affidavit. The result reached in the principal case is a desirable one,
and a test of admissibility based upon a distinction between misconduct
which is evidenced by overt acts which are independently verifiable and that
which is not is a sensible solution to the competing policy factors in the area
of jurors' affidavits. The problem now remains to clear away the unnecessary distinction between misconduct and the effect of misconduct, thereby
leaving only one test to be applied.
Herbert R. Brown, S. Ed.

